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[O]ne cannot sensibly have in mind the thought that "the People"
is some special sort of entity-whether comprising all citizens or
only a majority of them-with a will of its own that is concep-
tually independent of and genetically antecedent to political insti-
tutions.
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the legal realist movement, it has been widely understood
that most issues of constitutional law do not have a single correct answer.
As a result, countless legal scholars have wrestled with the legitimacy of
allowing unelected judges to invalidate the policy decisions of elected rep-
* A.J. Thomas Faculty Scholar, Associate Dean for Research, and Associate Pro-
fessor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. I am grateful to Barry Friedman
and other participants in this Symposium for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
Essay. I would also like to thank Chaoyi Ding and Matt Martin for excellent research assis-
tance.
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resentatives on constitutional grounds. While legal scholars have been ob-
sessed with the countermajoritarian difficulty that is allegedly posed by
judicial review in a democracy,' political scientists have sought to explain
what motivates judicial decision making in the absence of meaningful legal
constraints. 2 The leading factors political scientists have identified include
the political affiliations of the justices, their personal policy preferences,
and occasional concerns about the institutional interests of the judiciary.'
Although such findings may not surprise legal scholars, the political influ-
ences on courts are difficult to square with traditional conceptions of the
rule of law and seem to exacerbate the countermajoritarian difficulty in light
of the life tenure and unelected status of the federal judiciary.
Professor Barry Friedman's tour de force of the history of the relation-
ship between the United States Supreme Court and public opinion, The Will
of the People, challenges important aspects of the conventional wisdom in
law and political science.' Friedman contends not only that the public sup-
ports the institution of judicial review, but also that "[o]ver time, through a
dialogue with the justices, the Constitution comes to reflect the considered
judgment of the American people regarding their most fundamental val-
ues."' If it is true that the Court's decisions ultimately reflect the will of the
people, the democratic legitimacy of judicial review can no longer be so
easily disparaged on the grounds that the practice is "counter-majoritarian."
Moreover, if the justices are compelled to reach decisions that are consistent
with the will of the people, they are subject to a meaningful constraint that
may dissuade them from voting based solely on partisan or ideological
grounds, even if "the law" does not provide definitive answers to constitu-
tional questions. Friedman therefore ultimately concludes that the "threat"
of judicial review to American democracy is routinely overstated, and that
we should be more concerned about the Court's ability to fulfill its "hope"
of protecting the fundamental rights of minorities: "What we ought to care
deeply about, what we ought to be asking, is how much capacity the justices
have to act independently of the public's views, how likely they are to do
so, and in what situations."'
While I tend to agree with this conclusion, my sense of the Court's in-
teraction with public opinion is somewhat different. The thesis of this Es-
1. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of An Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002).
2. See Barry Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 258
(2005).
3. See Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court
Invalidate Federal Statutes?, 101 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 321, 325-36 (2007).
4. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
5. Id. at 367-68.
6. Id. at 373.
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say is that by integrating Professor Friedman's theory of constitutional di-
alogue with other recent scholarship on the constitutional functions that are
performed by legislation and administrative law,' we can develop a better
understanding of the broader process of American constitutional change.
The complete framework of American constitutional change that emerges
from this exercise helps, in turn, to place Friedman's invaluable contribu-
tion to the enterprise in its most illuminating context.
Part I of the Essay explains my primary source of skepticism regard-
ing Friedman's project, which stems from the conceptual difficulties and
measurement problems associated with any effort to ascertain "the will of
the people." In my view, his story demonstrates that the Court needs the
support of powerful friends or allies to make bold or controversial deci-
sions. Moreover, the societal reaction to judicial review is typically ex-
pressed through the work of other democratic institutions. Part II explains
that Bill Eskridge, John Ferejohn, and other prominent scholars have begun
to recognize that legislation and administrative law perform important con-
stitutional functions in the modern regulatory state, and that legislation and
administrative law and the Constitution have a reciprocal influence upon
one another. Thus, constitutional norms have a significant impact on how
statutes and regulations are interpreted and implemented, and public norms
and practices that are initially embraced by statutes and regulations some-
times influence the meaning of the Constitution. Part III integrates the les-
sons of administrative constitutionalism and Friedman's theory of constitu-
tional dialogue, and sets forth the novel framework for understanding the
process of American constitutional change that emerges. Part IV identifies
some of the key questions that are posed by this framework, and discusses a
few of its implications. Perhaps most important, regulatory scholars, consti-
tutional theorists, political scientists, political activists, and public officials
are all engaged in the common enterprise of developing constitutional
meaning on a daily basis. Accordingly, theories of representation and deli-
berative democracy should be of central relevance to normative theorizing
7. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES:
THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2010); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Su-
per-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., America's Statutory "con-
stitution ", 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2007); Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law
As Constitutional Common Law, I 10 COLUM. L. REV. 479 (2010); Ernest A. Young, The
Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408 (2007). For other examples of
leading works that view important aspects of legislation or administrative law as constitu-
tionally-motivated, see Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and
Legitimacy in the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 461 (2003); Philip P. Frickey,
Getting From Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal Process Theory, and
Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CAL. L. REV. 397 (2005);
Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952 (2007);
Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups In American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
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about this enterprise. Such theories offer the best prospects for developing a
Constitution that respects the rights and interests of everyone, and thereby
fulfills the central hope that American society has traditionally placed in
judicial review.
I. RECONSTRUCTING THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE
The Will of the People is an extremely well told story about the history
of the Supreme Court and its relationship to the American people. The
scope of the underlying research is remarkable, and the conceptual theme of
each chapter persuasively captures the essence of a major period in the
Court's history. One could therefore learn a great deal about the history of
the Supreme Court by reading this book without any prior knowledge of the
scholarly debates regarding the Court's democratic legitimacy or what mo-
tivates its decision making. Readers who are familiar with these academic
debates, however, are likely to be struck by the book's skillful combination
of familiarity and novelty. For example, while every lawyer knows about
Lochner and "the switch in time that saved nine," the notion that the Court's
decisions ultimately reflect the will of the people poses important chal-
lenges to the conventional wisdom in legal scholarship and political
science.! Part of the persuasive power of the book may therefore stem pre-
cisely from the story's familiarity, which naturally suggests that Professor
Friedman's conclusions about the close relationship between the Court's
decisions and public opinion are obviously correct.'
While I have no doubt that the Supreme Court takes its perceptions of
the likely societal reaction into account in reaching some decisions, I am
deeply skeptical of Friedman's basic premise that we can accurately assess
the extent to which judicial review reflects "the will of the people." First,
this concept raises difficult problems associated with ascertaining whose
preferences should count. Second, to the extent that Friedman is referring
to the preferences of a majority of Americans,o it is not clear how they
8. See supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text.
9. Cf FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 364 (pointing out that since the early stages of
the Rehnquist Court, "a small band of political scientists and law professors questioned the
common assumption that judicial review ran contrary to the popular will," and explaining
that "[t]hough the [Court's tendency to fall within the range of mainstream popular opinion]
seemed obvious to these scholars, this view for the most part remained buried in the acade-
my-hardly prominent even there").
10. See Barry Friedman, Reply: The Will of the People and the Process of Constitu-
tional Change, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1232, 1232-33 (2010) (explaining that "the central
premise of The Will of the People . . . is that judicial review does not require some special
justification [because] when courts engage in it, they adhere to the will of the majority");
FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 17-18 (recognizing the challenges associated with capturing "the
evolving views of the American public," but claiming that "there is very good reason to have
faith in the possibility of chronicling changes in public attitudes toward the idea and the
840 [Vol. 2010:837
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could accurately be measured, especially on the type of detailed legal and
policy questions that regularly confront the Supreme Court." My sense is
that Friedman's story could be reconstructed to stand for the proposition
that in order to make bold or controversial decisions, the Court must have
the support of powerful friends or allies.12 While this may be an important
constraint, it cannot guarantee that judicial review will ultimately reflect the
will of the people.
institution that is judicial review" because (1) "with the luxury of hindsight, it is possible to
see what the issues were and which side prevailed"; (2) "the elites whose views [are reported
in the book] were chosen or retained their places precisely because of their ability to give
voice to the sentiments of their constituents and audiences"; and (3) "in some of the most
crucial moments in the struggle over judicial review there was an extraordinary engagement
of the American people"); infra note 16.
11. See Doni Gewirtzman, Glory Days: Popular Constitutionalism, Nostalgia, and
the True Nature of Constitutional Culture, 93 GEO. L.J. 897, 928-30, 934 (2005) (reviewing
social science literature on political knowledge and opinion formation and concluding that
"the People do not serve as a particularly stable or reliable check on the Court's interpretive
power" because "[plopular interpretive preferences, where they exist, are often made without
much awareness about politics generally, or the Constitution and the Court in particular," and
"once a preference is ascertained, it often proves unstable and easily susceptible to elite
influence, lending a distinctly dubious quality to popular communications across the law-
politics divide").
12. This reading of The Will of the People is compatible with some new institutional
theories of public law and related separation of powers approaches. See, e.g., William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term-Foreword: Law As Equi-
librium, 108 HARV. L. REv. 26 (1994); see also Friedman, supra note 2, at 263, 273-74, 308-
20 (describing political science literature on the interaction between courts and other gov-
ernment institutions); Keith E. Whittington, Once More Unto the Breach: PostBehavioralist
Approaches to Judicial Politics, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 601, 631 (2000) (book review)
(describing new institutional approaches to the study of courts and the law and recognizing
that they have "encouraged the examination of connections, disjunctions, and interactions
between the law, the courts, and other political and social institutions"); infra note 52. As
Professor Friedman pointed out during the Symposium for which this paper was written, the
framework for constitutional change that is set forth in this Essay also fits comfortably within
legal process theory. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra, at 27-28 (describing legal process
theory's "emphasis on the creation of law by interacting institutions, the purposiveness of
law and these institutions, and the mediating role of procedure," and recognizing that "legal
process theorizing about public law has enjoyed a renaissance"); HENRY M. HART, JR. &
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION
OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds., 1994). This Essay's emphasis on
the importance of deliberation also suggests the potential value of a move toward an institu-
tional theory of deliberative democracy. In any event, Friedman recognizes that "[p]olitical
scientists in particular tend to focus on the institutions of government, rather than the people
at large," but he claims that "[t]he Court has to be attuned to aroused public opinion because
it is the public that can save a Court in trouble with political leaders and likewise can moti-
vate political leaders against it." FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 375. As explained above, I
agree that an "aroused citizenry" is one constituency that can occasionally provide support
for the Court's decisions. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
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The notion of "the will of the people" requires a theory of whose pre-
ferences should count. This question could be answered by focusing on the
work of elected officials within the institutions of government or by empha-
sizing the identifiable preferences of the general public." Moreover, a
theory of popular sovereignty could emphasize the pre-political preferences
of the relevant citizens or officials-or focus on the preferences that are
expressed after a process of reasoned deliberation. 4 A theory that focuses
on the pre-political preferences of the general public is a direct democracy,
whereas a theory that focuses on the preferences expressed by elected offi-
cials after a process of reasoned deliberation is a republican democracy.
The precise nature of popular sovereignty in the United States is further
complicated by the "dual sovereignty" established by federalism."
The point is simply that any effort to assess the relationship between
judicial review and the will of the people raises complex issues of political
theory that Friedman does not explicitly resolve." Many legal scholars and
judges have an unfortunate tendency to equate the preferences of elected
officials or the work of government institutions with the preferences of a
majority of citizens." Friedman purports to avoid this mistake by suggest-
ing that the Supreme Court can simultaneously invalidate legislative or ex-
ecutive action and remain faithful to the will of the people. Meanwhile, he
13. See Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term-Foreword: The Court's
Agenda-and the Nation's, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 52 (2006) (recognizing that some plausible
conceptions of democracy emphasize "active citizen involvement" and others emphasize
"faith in elected representatives").
14. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY?
13-15 (2004) (describing the fundamental differences between aggregative and deliberative
conceptions of democracy).
15. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-19 (1997) ("It is incontestible that
the Constitution established a system of 'dual sovereignty.' Although the States surrendered
many of their powers to the new Federal Government, they retained 'a residuary and inviola-
ble sovereignty."') (citations omitted).
16. For discussions of Friedman's conception of "the will of the people," see
FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 369-72 (explaining that "both the hope and the threat of judicial
review rest on a common supposition: that the judiciary even has the capacity of running
contrary to the will of the majority," and claiming that "[t]he people and their elected repre-
sentatives have had the ability all along to assert pressure on the judges, and they have done
so on numerous occasions") (emphasis omitted); Friedman, supra note 10, at 1240-44 (elabo-
rating on his conception of "the people"); see also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
This problem is pervasive in the literature on popular constitutionalism. See Gewirtzman,
supra note I1, at 900 (recognizing that "[t]he problem begins with 'the People,' a term popu-
lar constitutionalists invoke with some regularity but are reluctant to define," and explaining
that "[alt different times, 'the People' inhabit the shoes of, among other entities, the electo-
rate, prominent interest groups, identity-based social movements, the United States Congress,
the President, political parties, state government institutions, or impact-litigation plaintiffs").
17. See Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV.
1253, 1256-77 (2009) (describing the dominance of "the political accountability paradigm"
in modem public law and claiming that its underlying assumptions are implausible).
842 [Vol. 2010:837
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suggests that the will of the people requires at least some degree of reasoned
deliberation since he is ultimately interested in evaluating judicial review's
capacity to reflect "the considered judgment of the American people" re-
garding the Constitution's meaning.'" He therefore appears to be operating
under a hybrid theory of constitutional democracy, which equates the will of
the people with the preferences of the general public after a period of rea-
soned deliberation.
This may be an attractive notion of constitutional democracy, but it re-
lies upon a conception of the will of the people that is virtually impossible
to measure. For example, any effort to assess the people's will regarding
the constitutionality of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
which was established by Congress pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,"
would require the general public to know about the relevant issues, have
identifiable preferences about the appropriate outcome, and be capable of
evaluating a judicial decision on the matter. We would also need a reliable
mechanism for aggregating public preferences, and (if there is a requirement
of reasoned deliberation) a means of ensuring that citizens have taken other
interests and perspectives into account before formulating an opinion. It
seems obvious that these criteria could only be satisfied in exceptional cir-
cumstances because (1) the general public knows very little about most of
the specific legal and policy questions that are resolved by our govern-
ment;20 (2) there is reason to doubt that the public has preexisting or fixed
18. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 367-68 ("Over time, through a dialogue with the
justices, the Constitution comes to reflect the considered judgment of the American people
regarding their most fundamental values."); see also Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular
Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2599 (2003) (claiming that "judicial interpreta-
tions of the Constitution reflect popular will over time," but recognizing that the process is
"mediated" by several notable aspects of the system, and claiming that "[t]he mediated na-
ture of judicial review is a good thing, because the normative role of judicial review requires
that constitutional adjudication not be as immediately responsive to popular will as are other
aspects of our system").
19. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.).
20. See Gewirtzman, supra note 11, at 917-21 (describing social science literature
on political knowledge and reporting that "[in general, large segments of the public are
essentially ignorant about the Court and its work"); Jane S. Schacter, Political Accountabili-
ty, Proxy Accountability, and the Democratic Legitimacy of Legislatures, in THE LEAST
ExAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 45, 47 (Ri-
chard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006) ("It is an article of faith among political scien-
tists that citizens are woefully uninformed about politics, and scholars have rarely resorted to
understatement in characterizing the public's knowledge gaps."); Ilya Somin, Political Ig-
norance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty: A New Perspective on the Central Obses-
sion of Constitutional Theory, 89 IowA L. REV. 1287, 1304 (2004) ("The most important
point established in some five decades of political knowledge research is that the majority of
American citizens lack even basic political knowledge."); Staszewski, supra note 17, at
1266-67 ("The fact that most citizens lack even basic political knowledge has been almost
universally accepted by political scientists for decades."). For the leading work of political
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preferences on many of the legal or policy questions that are brought to its
attention;21 (3) and most of the Supreme Court's decisions are very compli-
cated and of little interest to ordinary citizens.22 Not only is survey data on
aggregated public opinion notoriously contingent and unreliable,23 but pub-
lic opinion polls on legal and policy issues have only existed since the 1940s
and '50s.24 While one might think that consistent or longstanding public
opinion would reflect a modicum of reasoned deliberation, those are pre-
cisely the matters on which people may be most inclined to rely though-
tiessly on received tradition or conventional wisdom.25
One might object that my chosen example is unfair because the consti-
tutionality of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is a relative-
science on this subject, see MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & ScoTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS
KNow ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996).
21. See Gewirtzman, supra note 11, at 928-30 (claiming that "high levels of ignor-
ance often act to destabilize popular input into constitutional culture," and explaining that
"[1]ack of basic political knowledge creates a fertile opportunity for elites to manipulate
public opinion or distort the interpretive messages sent through participatory acts"); Schacter,
supra note 20, at 59-63 (recognizing the difficulty of reliably identifying "the content or
strength of public attitudes on key issues," and explaining that "public opinion may be a
considerably more top-down affair, one in which politicians (among others) actively try to
shape and sway public opinion"); see also Staszewski, supra note 17, at 1267-68.
22. See Friedman, supra note 18, at 2617-23, 2631-33 (reviewing social science
literature on public information about the Court and reporting that "[s]cholars are uniform in
their assessment that the salience of the output of courts is low"); Schauer, supra note 13, at
11 (comparing the Supreme Court's agenda with the policy issues that are of greatest interest
to the public, and concluding that the contrast "shows that the Court . .. operates overwhel-
mingly in areas of low public salience, either because the Court is involved with rights-based
side constraints on central policy decisions made by others, or because the Court deals with
those second-order structural, procedural, and jurisdictional dimensions of policymaking
which may have a substantial impact on the content of policy but which command little
attention from the people or their representatives"); see also Jamal Greene, Selling Original-
ism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 702 (2009) (stating that Schauer's conclusion "is beyond reasonable
dispute," and claiming that "[t]he set of issues that most people care about most of the time is
radically different than, and indeed barely conversant with, those that the Court's typical
docket comprises").
23. See, e.g., GEORGE F. BISHOP, THE ILLUSION OF PUBLIC OPINION: FACT AND
ARTIFACT IN AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION POLLS (2005); Gewirtzman, supra note 11, at 928-
29.
24. See SARAH E. IGO, THE AVERAGED AMERICAN: SURVEYS, CITIZENS, AND THE
MAKING OF A MASS PUBLIC (2007).
25. See Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1569,
1576-77 (2007) (claiming that "those who rely upon tradition or longstanding practices as the
basis for forming their own judgments do not contribute anything to the epistemic value of
the practice, because they are not forming their own judgments independently"). Respon-
dents to public opinion polls may also try to give answers that they think are consistent with
existing societal norms. See Michael Margolis, Public Opinion, Polling, and Political Beha-
vior, 472 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCi. 61, 64 (1984) ("Publicly expressed opinions
are often conventionalized versions of what people really think, conventionalized so as to
conform to what they perceive to be societal norms.").
844 (Vol. 2010:837
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ly obscure and technical question, but the reality is that most of the Supreme
Court's constitutional decisions fall into the same categories.26 Moreover,
several judges and scholars have pointed out that the case that was recently
decided by the Supreme Court on this issue was potentially one of the most
important separation-of-powers cases in many years involving the structure
of administrative agencies.27 The Court sometimes addresses much higher
profile issues, but those cases also tend to involve relatively contentious
topics, which can make accurately assessing public opinion on the precise
legal questions that are resolved by the Court quite difficult.28 As Friedman
recognizes, the Court's decisions on these topics will also influence public
opinion, which makes it difficult to tell if the Supreme Court is following
the will of the people or leading the public's understanding of what the
Constitution means.29 Finally, as Friedman also acknowledges, the extent to
26. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Powers, Independent Agencies, and
Financial Regulation: The Case of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 485, 485
(2009); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667, 685
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); Kimberly N. Brown, Presidential Control of
the Elite "Non-Agency", 88 N.C. L. REV. 71, 74 (2009). The Court held that the statute
violated Article II because the members of the Board were unduly insulated from removal
from office by the President. See Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd.,
130 S. Ct. 3138 (2010). The Court's decision did not receive a great deal of media attention,
partly because the majority issued a relatively narrow opinion that refrained from revisiting
existing precedent or significantly disrupting the operation of the challenged statutory
scheme. This example illustrates that the Court has a variety of means at its disposal to keep
a low profile, even when it creates precedent that could have significant repercussions in
future cases.
28. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 8 (recognizing that "when the issue is fraught,
the American people typically disagree over what the Constitution means," which "is why
judicial decisions interpreting the Constitution become so controversial"). In this regard, it is
important to distinguish between public opinion on a general topic, and public opinion on the
specific policy issues that are before the Court. Moreover, to the extent we are concerned
with the public's understanding of the Constitution, it is important to distinguish between
public opinion on the underlying policy issue and public opinion on the constitutional validi-
ty of a challenged practice. For example, one can be in favor of laws prohibiting flag-
burning (as a policy matter), and still believe that flag-burning should be constitutionally
protected. Nonetheless, it would seem very difficult as a practical matter to prevent these
two distinct questions from becoming conflated in any effort to measure public opinion on
the issues that are resolved by the Court. See Friedman, supra note 18, at 2601 (recognizing
that "[t]he populace does not typically express its desires in terms of what the Constitution
should mean, but what it wants at present," and explaining that "when present preferences
collide with constitutional limitations, the tension between the two tends to distort the lat-
ter"). Frederick Schauer, who is attentive to these distinctions, contends that the constitu-
tional issues that are resolved by the Court are not necessarily salient to the public, even
when a case involves high-profile issues such as terrorism and crime. See Schauer, supra
note 22, at 25-30.
29. See Friedman, supra note 18, at 2624-29, 2631-35 (reviewing social science
literature on "the nature and obduracy of public reaction" to the Court's decisions, and re-
cognizing that "the Supreme Court likely influences public opinion quite a bit, whether inten-
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which the practice of judicial review is understood to comport with public
opinion may vary depending on the level of generality with which one
frames the question.30 The American people might therefore simultaneously
believe, for example, that the Supreme Court should have the power of judi-
cial review, ' that it was the most appropriate institution to resolve the con-
tested presidential election of 2000,32 and that Bush v. Gore was a politically
motivated decision." They have little basis, however, to assess whether the
decision properly interpreted the Constitution-which would seem to be the
most highly relevant question.34
Because of the difficulties associated with defining and measuring the
will of the people, Friedman frequently relies upon the expressed prefe-
rences of elected officials and other elites, as well as the results of various
elections, to ascertain the will of the people on particular questions." Yet,
tionally or unintentionally"); infra note 151 and accompanying text (explaining that The Will
of the People suggests that judicial review will have complex and uncertain effects on the
political process and public perceptions of the Court's legitimacy); see also Charles H.
Franklin & Liane C. Kosaki, Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public
Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. Sd. REv. 751 (1989) (analyzing the impact of Roe v.
Wade on public attitudes toward abortion); supra note 21 and accompanying text (claiming
that public opinion is frequently shaped by political elites).
30. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 379-80 (discussing the distinction between "spe-
cific" and "diffuse" support for the Court's decisions and the power of judicial review);
Friedman, supra note 18, at 2614-20 (same).
31. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Sup-
port for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. Sci. 635, 635, 640 (1992) (recognizing that "the
Supreme Court has traditionally fared well in the estimations of the public, especially in
comparison with other political institutions," and reporting that only 10 percent of a survey
sample said "it would support the elimination of the Court's power to review and invalidate
acts of Congress"); James L. Gibson, et al., Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States
Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. Sci. 354, 358-60 (2003) (reporting the results of survey data
that "reveal a remarkably high level of loyalty toward the Supreme Court on the part of most
Americans," as well as "widespread approval of the performance of the Supreme Court ...
even in the aftermath of Bush v. Gore").
32. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 358 (describing the results of opinion polls that
overwhelmingly identified the U.S. Supreme Court as "'the best institution to make a final
decision to resolve the controversy in Florida') (citations omitted).
33. See id. (reporting that "[a] majority of those asked believed the justices were
influenced by their 'personal feelings' in deciding the presidential election, and only a bare
majority thought the decision 'fair') (citations omitted); cf id at 336-37 (claiming that
"[t]he outrage that followed Bush v. Gore [from the political left] was unlike anything that
had met the Court, since at least Dred Scott," and noting that "some claimed that the justices
had made their choice in order to assure the continued conservative ideology of the Supreme
Court").
34. Friedman points out that "almost no one in the entire legal academy, on either
end of the political spectrum, was prepared to defend the Court's actual reasoning" in Bush v.
Gore. Id. at 334.
35. See, e.g., id. at 168, 177-82 (describing how "figures from politics, social
movements, the legal academy, and even the bench struck back" against both judicial deci-
sions that invalidated popular legislation and the power of judicial review during the Lochner
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the same dynamics that make it difficult to identify the will of the people on
a specific legal or policy question also make it problematic to equate the
results of an election, the preferences of an elected official, or the outcomes
generated by political institutions with the preferences of the general public
on a particular matter.3 6  Moreover, one of the most striking aspects of
Friedman's story is how often the issues that confronted the Supreme Court
divided significant constituencies within American society. To consider
just a few examples, Marbury v. Madison pitted the Federalists against the
Republicans;37 the Nullification Crisis pitted federal officials against the
states (a recurring theme);" Dred Scott pitted the North against the South
(another recurring theme); post-Reconstruction decisions pitted corporate
America and the Republican party against state governments and courts; 9
and Brown v. Board of Education pitted the President and the North against
Congress and the South.4 In each of these situations, any effort to ascertain
the extent to which the decisions of the Court reflected "the will of the
people" would be an extraordinarily difficult and speculative task.
Nonetheless, I believe that Friedman's story can be reconstructed to
provide a somewhat different lesson about the relationship between the
practice of judicial review and public opinion. What history really teaches,
I think, is that the Supreme Court cannot make bold or controversial deci-
sions without the support of powerful friends or allies. For example, Chief
Justice Marshall's "deft move" in Marbury v. Madison, "the one applauded
by many in years hence, was in announcing fundamental principles of con-
stitutional government and claiming great authority for the judiciary to en-
force them, all the while managing to avoid requiring anyone to honor that
authority in any tangible way."4 1 In other words, because "Marshall could
era, while acknowledging that "[g]iven that opinion polling still barely existed, it is impossi-
ble to state with certainty whether the contested . .. decisions did in fact trump the will of the
majority"); id. at 276-77 (describing how Richard Nixon successfully ran against crime dur-
ing the 1968 election in the wake of public opinion polls that expressed substantial opposi-
tion to Miranda and other decisions that protected the rights of criminal defendants, while
acknowledging that "the polls themselves [may have] misrepresented what the decision
actually said"). For a critique of the reliability of the post-Miranda opinion polls, see Corin-
na Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in
the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1361, 1421-24 (2004).
36. See Staszewski, supra note 17, at 1266-71.
37. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 44-71 (describing "the partisan battles of the
early 1800s" and the notion of judicial independence that emerged).
38. See id. at 72-104 (describing the states' defiance of the Supreme Court's authori-
ty and how national leaders eventually supported the federal judiciary).
39. See id. at 137-38, 150-66 (explaining that the Supreme Court achieved promi-
nence in the generation following the Civil War, in part, by protecting corporate interests
from state interference).
40. See id. at 242-48 (describing the defiance by officials in the South and the sup-
port of the Court by the North and President Eisenhower).
41. Id. at 62.
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not order relief from the Republicans and hope to see his will followed....
[,] the Court did the only thing it could: deliver a stout lecture on constitu-
tional principles and the proper role of the judiciary and withdraw."4 2 Simi-
larly, in the Nullification Crisis of 1833, the states' officially-sanctioned
defiance of the Supreme Court's decisions only faded after President And-
rew Jackson "denied that states had a right to nullify federal law, threatened
to use force to defend the Union, and affirmed the Supreme Court's role in
arbitrating constitutional questions."43 Perhaps the clearest example of the
Court's reliance on powerful friends and allies is reflected in the generation
following the Civil War, when "[t]he Court found its way to the center of
the American stage by rendering decisions that catered to the needs of those
who had power over it."" Thus, in addition to abandoning Reconstruction,45
the Court "went on a binge of striking down state laws to protect corporate
interests and property rights."46 These decisions "were the product of a de-
liberate effort by the country's rulers to pander to the captains of industry."4 7
Likewise, the decisions in Brown v. Board of Education were supported by
the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations.48 When massive resistance to
these decisions erupted in the South, "Eisenhower finally was forced-very
much against his inclinations-to send federal troops into Little Rock, Ar-
kansas, to restore order."49 In the wake of these events, the Supreme Court
issued what is frequently considered the "strongest statement of judicial
supremacy in all of American history."o As Friedman puts it, "The Court
was the Constitution, and the Constitution was the supreme law-at least so
long as there was force backing it up.""
I am not suggesting that the Court's decisions in these cases were con-
trary to public opinion. Moreover, an "aroused citizenry" may be one con-
stituency that can occasionally provide crucial support for the Court's deci-
sions. Most often, however, the Court's decisions will require-support from
powerful elected officials or political institutions, and the views of the gen-
42. Id. at 63.
43. Id. at 73.
44. Id. at 137.
45. See id. at 138-49.
46. Id. at 160.
47. Id. at 138; see also id. at 155-66.
48. See id. at 245, 247-49.
49. Id. at 247.
50. Id. at 248 (citing Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)).
51. Id. Commentators have questioned the extent to which Brown effectively pro-
moted social change. In response to Gerald Rosenberg's famous book on this subject, The
Hollow Hope, Friedman explains: "What Rosenberg documented (albeit not uncontroversial-
ly) is a point that history has proven time and again: courts make headway when other politi-
cal actors support them; they fail when they are opposed." See id. at 278 n.403.
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eral public will not be directly relevant.52 The New Deal could, therefore,
be understood as an example of a rare constitutional moment when the con-
sidered judgment of the American people resulted in an unwritten constitu-
tional amendment," but it could also be understood as an example of where
the Court was forced to change course because its prior understanding of the
Constitution was no longer shared by powerful friends or allies.S4 Most of
the lines of cases Friedman discusses are entirely consistent with this recon-
structed thesis, as depicted in the following chart:
Line of Cases Friends/Opponents Result
(1) Domestic Friend: Mainstream press Few powerful friends;
Security Cases Opponents: J. Edgar Court reverses course
(pp. 250-58) Hoover, Segregationists,
Anti-communists,
Conservative press,
Congress, and the Legal
Establishment
(2) School Prayer Friends: United Parents Some powerful friends;
(pp. 262-67) Association, Jews, Brief controversy;
Mainstream Protestant Decisions stick (albeit
Leadership, President with spotty compliance)
Kennedy
Opponents: Majority of
Public, New York Board
52. The notion that the Court's decisions are influenced by other political institu-
tions is supported by the literature on judicial politics. See, e.g., Mario Bergara et al., Model-
ing Supreme Court Strategic Decision Making: The Congressional Constraint, 28 LEGIS.
STUD. Q. 247 (2003); Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court as a Strategic National Policy-
maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583 (2001); Anna Harvey & Barry Friedman, Pulling Punches: Con-
gressional Constraints on the Supreme Court's Constitutional Rulings, 1987-2000, 31
LEGIs. STUD. Q. 533 (2006); see also supra note 12. But see Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-
Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AM. POL. SC. REV. 28
(1997) (finding that individual justices are unconstrained by the policy preferences of elected
officials and vote their own policy preferences). The extent to which the Court is influenced
directly by public opinion is less clear. See, e.g., Comment, Popular Influence on Supreme
Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 711 (1994) (providing competing views on whether
public opinion directly influences the Court's decisions); Friedman, supra note 2, at 320-29
(discussing the relevant literature). For a helpful summary of some of the most recent politi-
cal science literature on these questions, see Anna Harvey, The Will of Congress, 2010 MICH.
ST. L. REV. 729 (2010).
53. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 34-57 (1991).
54. Dred Scott is perhaps best understood as a case where the Court unwisely inter-
vened and raised the stakes of politics, see infra notes 145-51 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing this aspect of the Court's decision making and its importance in a system of adminis-
trative constitutionalism), and then went along with the views of the wrong friends or allies.
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(3) Reapportioning the Friends: State Courts, Some powerful friends;
Legislatures Press, Kennedy Adminis- Decisions stick
(pp. 267-70) tration
Opponents: Congress,
Assembly of the States
(4) Criminal Procedure Friends: Most States (via Lots of powerful friends;
a. Gideon state law and amicus Decision sticks








(4) Criminal Procedure Friend: Hubert No powerful friends;
b. Miranda Humphrey Decision sticks;
(pp. 274-77) Opponents: Most States Undoing of Warren








(4) Criminal Procedure Friends: NAACP Legal Few powerful friends;
c. The Death Penalty Defense Fund, ACLU Court Reverses Course
























Lots of powerful friends;
Decisions stick
(6) Right to an Abortion Friends: American Some powerful friends;
(pp. 295-99, 328-30, Medical Association, Decision sticks, as
352-53) American Public Health modified
Association, ABA,







(7) Affirmative Action Friends: Clinton Some powerful friends;
(pp. 325-27, 361-62) Administration, Decision sticks, as
Republican Congress, modified














The bottom line is that if the will of the people cannot accurately be
measured, and the Court needs the support of powerful friends or allies,





Michigan State Law Review
constitutional meaning necessarily takes on increased importance. The Su-
preme Court's inability to go it alone imposes a modest "democratic" con-
straint on the range of viable constitutional meanings, and the Court's un-
derstanding of the Constitution will often be influenced by the public norms
and practices that are embraced by other democratic institutions, including
executives, legislatures, and administrative agencies. The next Part of this
Essay explains that several prominent commentators have begun to explore
the constitutional functions that are performed by statutory and administra-
tive law in the modem regulatory state, and how these sources of law and
the Constitution have a reciprocal influence upon one another.
II. CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE MODERN REGULATORY STATE
The U.S. Constitution says little or nothing about many important mat-
ters of governance. It does establish the basic structure of our democracy,
recognize certain fundamental rights, and entrench those institutions and
norms against subsequent change through the ordinary political process."
But if one were seeking a full and accurate picture of the structure of Amer-
ican democracy and the public norms that are considered fundamental, the
information conveyed by reading the Constitution would be radically in-
complete."
In this regard, several prominent scholars, including Bill Eskridge,
John Ferejohn, Gillian Metzger, and Ernest Young, have recently claimed
that legislation and administrative law perform important constitutional
functions in the modern regulatory state.57 For example, statutes and their
implementing regulations create governmental institutions and define the
limits of their authority. Meanwhile, these sources of law have been known
to establish individual rights of tremendous importance. While statutes and
regulations are not as impervious to change as the U.S. Constitution, the
practices and norms they establish can become very well-entrenched as both
a legal and a practical matter. Accordingly, these scholars point out that
many of the legal rules and norms in our society that perform constitutional
functions are a creature of statutory or administrative law.
55. See Young, supra note 7, at 417-28 (describing the basic functions of a Constitu-
tion).
56. See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 5-22 (explaining that "super-statutes" are respon-
sible for establishing institutions of American government, electoral and political rules, and
private rights and public norms).
57. See supra note 7 (collecting sources).
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A. Structure
One basic function of a constitution is to 'constitute' the govern-
ment."" The American Constitution establishes three branches of govern-
ment with limited and enumerated powers and a variety of checks and bal-
ances, but it does not address some of the most important aspects of the
structure of the federal government." For example, Congress's operative
procedures, including such well-established and influential elements as the
committee system and the filibuster, were established by the internal rules
of the House and Senate because Article I of the Constitution provides that
"[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings."60 The exis-
tence of federal district courts and circuit courts of appeal, and their juris-
diction to resolve issues that arise under the Constitution and laws of the
United States, is a function of statutory law because Article III merely pro-
vides that "[t]he judicial Power . . . shall be vested . . . in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."' The
president's practice of requiring executive agencies to provide analyses of
the costs and benefits of major proposed regulations to the Office of Man-
agement and Budget for regulatory review by the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs has been imposed by a series of executive orders.62 Not
only does Article II fail to provide any explicit guidance on the validity of
this practice, but the Constitution says almost nothing about the administra-
tive state in general." Nonetheless, the modem regulatory state was estab-
lished and has operated since the New Deal pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and a host of other statutes, executive orders, regula-
tions, and administrative common law principles. The states have, of
course, adopted their own internal structures of governance (which include
such divergent practices as elected judges and direct democracy), in addi-
tion to sharing authority with Congress to establish most of the rules for
58. See Young, supra note 7, at 415.
59. See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 7-12 (describing gaps in Articles I-III that have
been filled by statutory and administrative law).
60. U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 5, cl. 2; STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. Doc. No. 106-
15 (2d Sess. 2000); CONSTITUTrION, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. I10-162 (1st Sess. 2009).
61. U.S. CONST. art. 1II, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
62. See, e.g., Executive Order 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981).
63. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 10 (claiming that "[t]he biggest
change in the Constitutional structure has been the creation of the modem administrative
state," and explaining that while scholars debate whether administrative agencies and their
delegated statutory authority are Constitutional, "almost no one seriously denies that both
phenomena are here to stay and have the effect of altering the structure of power in our na-
tional government, against as well as beyond the expectations of the Constitution's fra-
mers").
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how federal elections are conducted." Accordingly, it seems undeniable
that the structure of the modem regulatory state in the United States is pri-
marily a function of statutory and administrative law (and other forms of
"sub-constitutional" public law"-or small-c constitutional law), rather than
the provisions of the Constitution.
B. Rights
A second basic function of a constitution is to "confer certain rights on
individuals."" The American Constitution contains a Bill of Rights and a
few important amendments, which impose limits on governmental authority
and identify some fundamental rights. Because many of these provisions
are open-textured, the Supreme Court has elaborated upon their meaning
over time through the process of judicial review, in addition to recognizing
a handful of unenumerated rights."7 Regardless of the Court's performance,
American citizens have numerous rights that are recognized or protected by
statutory and administrative law, even if they are not protected by the Con-
stitution.6 8 Some of these rights and norms have become sufficiently well-
established in our society that they could easily be regarded as fundamen-
tal.69 For example, citizens have a right to be free from invidious discrimi-
nation on the basis of age or disability.70 Moreover, the government has at
least some affirmative obligation to protect the environment" and to provide
64. See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 14 ("Articles I and II of the Constitution leave the
details of election rules and process to Congress and the states.").
65. For one prominent scholar's use of this term, see Philip P. Frickey, Interpreta-
tion on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURv. AM. L.
477 (1996).
66. See Young, supra note 7, at 416.
67. See David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877 (1996).
68. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 5 ("Americans have created statuto-
ry and administrative rights and liberties that are both less dramatic and much broader than
Large "C" Constitutional rights.").
69. See, e.g., id at 33 (claiming that "administrative constitutionalism, including but
not limited to Constitutional analysis by executive and legislative officials, is the dominant
governmental mechanism for the evolution of America's fundamental normative commit-
ments"); Young, supra note 7, at 424 (claiming that "many rights that are fundamental for
individuals in modern America are entirely creatures of statute").
70. See Eskridge, supra note 7, at 18 (explaining that "federal statutes have extended
the anti-discrimination norm to include disabled persons, older persons, and, potentially,
lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgendered people," and that "[t]he purpose of these statutes is
to extend Brown's anti-discrimination principle to groups the Supreme Court has not pro-
tected under the aegis of the Equal Protection Clause").
71. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 254, 263 (describing "the green
constitution," and claiming that "the effective debate between green and libertarian under-
standings of property has, for most practical purposes, been carried out at the small 'c' con-
stitutional level, and at that level it has been foundationally important").
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citizens with an adequate education, social security, Medicare, and protec-
tion from threats to our national security.72 Unlike rights that are formally
established by the Constitution, the rights that are recognized by statutes
and regulations frequently impose affirmative obligations on government
and limitations on the autonomy of private citizens.73 As a result, the "ad-
ministrative constitution" is capable of embracing positive rights and unen-
cumbered by the state action doctrine. It may therefore be as important as
the Constitution in recognizing and protecting fundamental rights in Ameri-
can society.
C. Entrenchment
The third basic function of a constitution is to entrench institutional
structures and rights against change through the ordinary political process.74
Thus, Article V requires a supermajority of both chambers of Congress to
propose a constitutional amendment, which must be ratified by three-
quarters of the states." This procedure has proven impossible to satisfy on
any significant topic in recent years, and the American Constitution has
only been amended twenty-seven times in history." The difficulty of for-
mally amending the Constitution is frequently offered as both an explana-
tion and a justification for treating the Constitution as a living document in
the course of judicial review." The relative ease of amending statutes and
regulations (as well as executive orders and congressional rules), therefore,
arguably distinguishes the Constitution from other sources of institutional
structures and rights."
72. See id. at 12 (pointing out that "[tihe Constitution of 1789 says little or nothing
about the right to a solid education .. . [or] rights to compete in a free and fair market, to
decent housing and adequate medical care, or to security against old age, sickness, accident,
and unemployment," and "[t]o the extent these securities are guaranteed by law, it is through
federal statutes and state law"); see also id. at 171-208 ("The Safety Net Constitution and the
Politics of Entrenchment"); id. at 387-430 ("The National Security Constitution"); Young,
supra note 7, at 412 ("Many of our most important individual rights-rights against discrim-
ination based on age or disability, rights to welfare, medical care, and social security-stem
from statutes rather than the Constitution.").
73. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 5 (claiming that "statutes commonly
provide positive rights to people, providing them with legal means to combat oppression and
discrimination").
74. See id. at 7; Young, supra note 7, at 426 ("A third function of many - but not all
- constitutions is to entrench certain legal arrangements against change.").
75. U.S. CONST. art. V.
76. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 49.
77. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 7, at 1267-68 (recognizing that "resolution
by the Court has proven easier for our system than the bulky process of formal constitutional
amendment entailed by Article V").
78. See Young, supra note 7, at 426 ("[I]f I am right that the constitutive and rights-
creating functions of the Constitution are shared pervasively by all manner of other legal
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Nonetheless, it is only relatively easy to amend a statute or regulation;
doing so can be both very difficult as a formal matter and virtually impossi-
ble as a practical matter in many circumstances. For example, the enact-
ment of a statute requires Congress to overcome the hurdles of bicameral-
ism and presentment, as well as other vetogates that have been established
pursuant to congressional rules and practices." Congress can therefore only
rarely enact statutes over the president's objection." Similarly, administra-
tive agencies use notice-and-comment procedures to promulgate legislative
rules, and their final decisions must subsequently withstand hard-look judi-
cial review." A number of scholars have criticized this standard of judicial
review on the grounds that it is too demanding, and therefore has an unfor-
tunate tendency to "ossify" the rulemaking process.82 Regardless of the
merits of this complaint, enacting a statute or regulation can often be quite
difficult, even when the proposal is supported by a majority of the partici-
pants in the lawmaking process. When a proposed statute or regulation
seeks to change institutional structures or legal rights that have become
deeply embedded in law and society as a normative matter, the task only
becomes more difficult, and may sometimes be impossible." Ernest Young
has therefore persuasively argued that "entrenchment is more multifarious
than binary and that ordinary legislation performs important entrenching
functions."84 Similarly, Eskridge and Ferejohn have recognized that some
statutes "successfully penetrate public normative and institutional culture in
a deep way," and they have referred to such laws as "super-statutes."85
materials, then entrenchment may be all that sets the canonical Constitution apart from the
rest of our legal system.").
79. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2-3; WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 66-68 (4th ed.
2007) (discussing the procedural hurdles that bills must surmount before becoming law).
80. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80
GEo. L.J. 523, 531 (1992) (modeling this situation and claiming that "the Framers anticipated
this possibility, approvingly, for they placed the executive veto in Article I, Section 7 to
prevent abrupt shifts in policy even when both chambers of Congress desired it").
81. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
82. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemak-
ing Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agen-
cy Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REv. 59 (1995).
83. See Young, supra note 7, at 427.
84. Id. at 415; see also id. at 459-61 (elaborating on this point).
85. Eskridge and Ferejohn define a super-statute as follows:
A super-statute is a law or series of laws that (1) seeks to establish a new normative
or institutional framework for state policy and (2) over time does "stick" in the
public culture such that (3) the super-statute and its institutional or normative prin-
ciples have a broad effect on the law-including an effect beyond the four corners
of the statute. . . . The law must also prove robust as a solution, a standard, or a
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While these scholars differ on some of the details, they all agree that entren-
chment is a relative matter and that "[e]ven constitutional change through
the Article V gauntlet may, in some circumstances, be politically easier than
eliminating or revising a longstanding statutory scheme backed by powerful
constituencies." 6
D. The Constitution's Influence on Statutory and Administrative Law
It is one thing to say that legislation and administrative law often per-
form the same functions as the Constitution and that the structures and
rights they establish can become deeply entrenched, but what is most impor-
tant for present purposes is that the Constitution and the practices and norms
that are established by statutory and administrative law have a reciprocal
relationship. This section explains that constitutional norms have a signifi-
cant impact on how statutes are interpreted and implemented. The next
section explains that practices and norms that are initially established
through statutory and administrative law sometimes influence the meaning
of the Constitution.
The clearest example of how constitutional norms can influence the
interpretation of statutes is provided by the substantive canons. The rule of
lenity provides that ambiguous criminal statutes should be interpreted nar-
rowly in favor of the accused based on constitutional principles of fair no-
tice and a desire to limit the scope of discretionary authority that is dele-
gated to prosecutors and judges." There is also a familiar rule of statutory
interpretation that "a serious constitutional challenge to a statute should be
avoided if the statute can plausibly be construed in a manner that makes the
constitutional question disappear."" The avoidance canon has proven con-
troversial because it has the potential to warp both Congress's intent with
respect to the statute at issue and the prevailing understanding of the Consti-
tution." Nonetheless, the canon has been persuasively defended on the
norm over time, such that its earlier critics are discredited and its policy and prin-
ciples become axiomatic for the public culture.
Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 7, at 1216.
86. Young, supra note 7, at 427; see also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 7-
8 (claiming that "[1]egislative and administrative deliberation over time can create en-
trenched governance structures and norms" (emphasis omitted)).
87. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 79, at 884-88 (describing the rule of lenity and
its purposes).
88. Frickey, supra note 7, at 399.
89. See William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-Branch
Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 831, 832 (2001) ("In practice, the avoidance canon is in ten-
sion with legislative supremacy because it frequently results in questionable statutory inter-
pretations and because it places the burden on Congress to act explicitly before a court will
interpret a law as coming close to the constitutional line-even though the enacting legisla-
ture might have intended to pass a constitutionally questionable statute and even though such
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grounds that it (1) encourages Congress to engage in focused deliberation
when it pushes the constitutional envelope; (2) avoids a direct confrontation
with the legislature and therefore promotes the institutional interests of the
judiciary; and (3) has the capacity to promote judicially under-enforced
constitutional norms.9o Similar functions are arguably performed by the
Court's more recently adopted "federalism canons,"" as well as by the ve-
nerable doctrine whereby courts will interpret statutes contrary to their plain
meaning to avoid absurd results.9 2 All of these doctrines resolve statutory
ambiguity or reject what might otherwise be the most natural reading of a
statute based, in large part, on the judiciary's desire to promote constitution-
al norms without directly engaging in judicial review."
Moreover, broader debates about the appropriate interpretive metho-
dologies in statutory interpretation are frequently the result of fundamental
disagreements about the nature of the constitutional structure and principles
of separated powers.94 For example, textualists tend to view bicameralism
and presentment as an effort to facilitate compromise.9 5 Meanwhile, they
understand judicial independence and the separation of legislative and judi-
cial functions as mechanisms to encourage Congress to enact bright-line
rules and enable citizens to hold the legislature accountable for its policy
decisions.96 As a result, they tend to believe that any deviation from the
a statute might, in fact, be constitutional."); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and
Conservatives Difer in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REv. 1403, 1405 (2002) (describ-
ing the avoidance canon as "a roving commission to rewrite statutes to taste").
90. See Frickey, supra note 7, at 446-55 (articulating the descriptive and normative
justifications for the avoidance canon).
91. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (applying the federalism
canon to hold that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act did not prohibit the operation
of a provision of the Missouri Constitution that required most state judges to retire at the age
of seventy).
92. See Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001 (2006) (describing
the constitutional underpinnings of the absurdity doctrine in statutory interpretation).
93. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
94. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U.
CHI. L. REv. 685, 686 (1999) (claiming that "structural constitutional analysis must, or at
least should, provide the starting point for evaluating the basic interpretive commitments of
formalism and antiformalism"). For a prominent example of such a debate, compare Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the "Judicial Power" in
Statutory Interpretation, 1776-1806, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 990 (2001), with John F. Manning,
Textualism and the Equity ofthe Statute, 101 COLUM. L REV. 1 (2001).
95. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2387,
2437-38 (2003); Manning, supra note 94, at 74-78.
96. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 95, at 2434-37 (claiming that "the absurdity
doctrine" in statutory interpretation conflicts with this aspect of the American constitutional
structure); Manning, supra note 94, at 56-70 (claiming that this aspect of the American con-
stitutional structure precludes the common law practice of using interpretive authority to
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"plain meaning" of statutes will undermine the deals that were enacted by
the legislature and the goals of the constitutional structure." In contrast,
purposivists tend to view bicameralism and presentment as a mechanism to
facilitate reasoned deliberation and achieve a broad consensus on ways of
promoting the public good that take the views and interests of minorities
into account.98 Accordingly, they tend to view the judiciary as a cooperative
partner in an effort to achieve the goals established by the legislature, par-
ticularly when circumstances change or unanticipated problems are pre-
sented.9 The point, however, is that both textualism and purposivism are
based on distinctive understandings of the constitutional structure.'o
Constitutional norms plainly influence how statutes are interpreted by
the federal judiciary, but they also influence the law that governs how sta-
tutes are implemented by administrative agencies. Gillian Metzger has
helpfully identified three different ways in which constitutional principles
can be manifested in administrative law.'0 ' First, some principles of admin-
istrative law are understood to be required by the Constitution or necessary
to avoid a constitutional violation.'02 The rules of procedural due process
and constitutional standing are prominent examples of administrative law
promote the equity of the statute); see also Staszewski, supra note 92, at 1022-28 (discussing
and critiquing these arguments).
97. See Manning, supra note 95, at 2390-91 (explaining that textualists believe "the
only safe course for a faithful agent is to enforce the clear terms of the statutes" that have
emerged from the legislative process because "the precise lines drawn by any statute may
reflect unrecorded compromises among interest groups, unknowable strategic behavior, or
even an implicit legislative decision to forego costly bargaining over greater textual preci-
sion"); Manning, supra note 94, at 18 ("Because statutory details may reflect only what
competing groups could agree upon, legislation cannot be expected to pursue its purposes to
their logical ends; accordingly, departing from a precise statutory text may do no more than
disturb a carefully wrought legislative compromise.").
98. See Staszewski, supra note 92, at 1021.
99. See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation:
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1764
(2010) ("In contrast to textualists, many purposivists urge a more expansive judicial role in
statutory interpretation, in which courts act in partnership with the legislature in the elabora-
tion of statutory meaning."); see also Staszewski, supra note 17, at 1308-11 (describing the
major differences between texualism and purposivism, and advocating an approach that
"would allow the judiciary to exercise the equitable discretion that is needed to avoid absurd
results and other highly problematic outcomes that were not anticipated by the legislature
and to serve as a 'cooperative partner' in the ongoing elaboration of the law when elected
representatives have not explicitly resolved a particular question").
100. Different theories of statutory interpretation also tend to reflect fundamentally
different conceptions of democratic theory. See generally Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy:
The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REv. 593
(1995).
101. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 487-505.
102. See id at 487-90.
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doctrines that fall within this category."o3 Second, a number of administra-
tive law principles and practices are inspired by constitutional norms, even
if they are not necessarily required by the Constitution.'" For example,
even though hard-look judicial review and the requirement that agencies
provide a reasoned explanation for their policy decisions arguably conflict
with the APA,'" federal courts have established these requirements in an
effort to replicate a well-functioning legislative process, avoid arbitrary
decision making, and thereby counteract the constitutionally suspect nature
of broad delegations of lawmaking authority to unelected and otherwise
unaccountable administrative agencies.'o' Similarly, the Court's usual re-
luctance to review agency inaction is based, in part, on a belief that judicial
review of an agency's failure to act would interfere with the president's
constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and therefore raise separa-
tion of powers concerns.'o Third, both courts and political officials some-
times create incentives or establish requirements to encourage agencies to
take constitutional norms seriously in their own decision-making
103. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266-69 (1970) (holding that proce-
dural due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before welfare benefits may
be terminated); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-63 (1992) (describing the
irreducible constitutional requirements of standing and holding that the Citizen Suit Provi-
sion of the Endangered Species Act was unconstitutional as applied because plaintiffs had
not established a cognizable injury in fact); see also Metzger, supra note 7, at 487 (offering
procedural due process as an example).
104. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 490-97.
105. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Waiting for Vermont Yankee III, IV and V? A Re-
sponse to Beermann and Lawson, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 902, 905-08 (2007) (describing
this argument).
106. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 490 (identifying hard-look review as a primary
example of "the ways that constitutional concerns have shaped development of ordinary
administrative law doctrines"); Glen Staszewski, Rejecting the Myth of Popular Sovereignty
and Applying an Agency Model to Direct Democracy, 56 VAND. L. REV. 395, 440-47 (2003)
("The net result of APA procedures and 'hard-look' judicial review under State Farm is to
encourage and enforce republican ideals of deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking in the
administrative lawmaking process."); see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justifi-
cation for the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1511, 1560 (1992) (explaining that "the
paradigmatic process for agency formulation of policy-informal rulemaking-is specifical-
ly geared to advance the requirements of civic republican theory"); Sunstein, supra note 7, at
56-68 (explaining that "[m]uch of modern administrative law is a means of serving the origi-
nal purposes of the nondelegation doctrine, and of promoting Madisonian goals, without
invalidating regulatory statutes," and claiming that hard-look judicial review and other ad-
ministrative law doctrines are "classically republican" because of their requirements of "de-
liberation" and "reasoned analysis").
107. See, e.g., Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004)
(holding that judicial review of an agency's "failure to act" under section 706(1) of the APA
"can proceed only where a plaintiff asserts that an agency failed to take a discrete agency
action that it is required to take"); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (holding that
administrative decisions declining to take enforcement action are presumptively immune
from judicial review under the APA).
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processes.'os For example, the Supreme Court has periodically suggested
that administrative procedures and decisions have a better chance of being
upheld against constitutional challenge if the relevant agency has carefully
considered and perhaps made accommodations to avoid potential constitu-
tional problems.'" Similarly, the political branches have issued directives
to agencies to protect federalism values, anti-discrimination norms, and
other public values in implementing their statutory authority." As ex-
plained below, several scholars have recently noted that even in the absence
of externally-created incentives to engage in serious constitutional dialogue,
regulatory agencies have sometimes played the leading role in developing
important constitutional norms through their own initiative."'
Finally, there are some important areas where constitutional norms
simultaneously influence both how the judiciary interprets statutes and the
resulting contents of administrative law. For example, while the Chevron
doctrine is purportedly based on Congress's intent for courts to defer to
reasonable interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions by agencies,"2
the Court has also justified this doctrine based on the president's superior
108. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 497-501.
109. See id. at 497-502 (providing examples from recent case law); cf William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Constitutional Horticulture: Deliberation-Respecting Judicial
Review, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1273, 1275 (2009) (claiming that "judicial review should avoid
closing off democratic deliberation, should respect the products of such deliberation, and
should create constitutional floors only when supported by deliberation among a wide array
of represented interests").
110. See, e.g., Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-4, 109 Stat.
48, 64-67 (1995) (codified in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C.) (requiring administrative agen-
cies to assess the effects of any major regulation imposing an intergovernmental mandate);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VI, §§ 601-05, 78 Stat. 252-53 (codified
in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (2006)) (prohibiting recipients of federal funds from en-
gaging in race discrimination).
111. See Metzger, supra note 7, at 504 ("Scholars are beginning to document a num-
ber of instances in which ... administrative agencies were at the forefront of developing new
understandings of constitutional rights."); see, e.g., Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the
Wires: The Post Office and the Birth of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 594
(2007) (claiming that "it was through the post office, not the Constitution or the Bill of
Rights, that the early Americans first established [the principle of communications privacy as
fundamental to the Fourth Amendment]"); ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 25-74
(developing their theory of administrative constitutionalism and providing the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act and the Family and Medical Leave Act as examples of statutes that estab-
lished new constitutional rights through this process); Sophia Z. Lee, Race and Rulemaking:
Civil Rights in the Administrative State, 1964-1977 (on file with author).
112. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-
44 (1984) (declaring that when Congress delegates authority to an administrative agency to
fill gaps in a statutory program, "a court may not substitute its own construction of a statuto-
ry provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency").
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political accountability for policy choices."' While the Court has also de-
scribed the limits of Chevron deference by reference to Congress's intent,"4
the emphasis that Mead and Skidmore placed on the value of procedural
safeguards and reasoned decision making suggest that those decisions may
have been inspired by the same constitutional values as hard-look judicial
review."' The Court has not invalidated a statute for violating the nondele-
gation doctrine since the New Deal, but it has narrowly construed broad
grants of authority to agencies through the process of statutory interpreta-
tion and thereby promoted the constitutional principle that law must be
made by Congress rather than the executive branch."' Accordingly, it
seems clear that constitutional norms frequently influence both how statutes
are interpreted by federal courts and how they are implemented by adminis-
trative agencies, as well as the level of deference that federal courts will
accord to agency decision making.
E. Statutory and Administrative Law's Influence on the Constitution
The Constitution's influence on legislation and administrative law is
not a one-way street. Rather, statutory and administrative law can also have
a significant impact on the formal and functional meaning of the Constitu-
tion. In their important new book, A Republic of Statutes, Bill Eskridge and
113. See id. at 865-66 ("While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government
to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency charged with
the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.").
114. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001) (holding that
"administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron
deference when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make
rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was
promulgated in the exercise of that authority").
115. See id. at 230 ("It is fair to assume generally that Congress contemplates admin-
istrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should underlie a pronounce-
ment of such force."); Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (recognizing that
the rulings, interpretations, and opinions of an administrator "do constitute a body of expe-
rience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guid-
ance," and stating that "[t]he weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade,
if lacking power to control"); see also supra note 106 and accompanying text (describing the
constitutional values that are promoted by a reasoned decision making requirement and hard-
look judicial review).
116. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 315, 316
(2000) ("Rather than invalidating federal legislation as excessively open-ended, courts hold
that federal administrative agencies may not engage in certain activities unless and until
Congress has expressly authorized them to do so.").
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John Ferejohn claim that "[i]n America's republic of statutes, republican
deliberation over fundamental national commitments has migrated, relative-
ly speaking, away from Constitutionalism and toward legislative and admin-
istrative constitutionalism.""' A major theme of their book is that "America
enjoys a constitution of statutes supplementing and often supplanting its
written Constitution as to the most fundamental features of governance.""
Because the Constitution leaves many important issues of democratic
governance open, statutory and administrative law will necessarily establish
institutional practices and public norms that go beyond those required by the
Constitution and thereby play a supplemental role in developing constitu-
tional meaning. Eskridge and Ferejohn emphasize that this supplemental
role is bolstered by the fact that the Constitution contains norms that are
under-enforced by the judiciary for institutional reasons; for example, the
Constitution has been interpreted not to govern the behavior of private par-
ties or to create positive rights."' They therefore explain that most of the
positive rights that have become entrenched in our society-"from the right
to family medical leave, a free market, and old-age pensions--do not clearly
rest on the text or structure of the Constitution." 2 '
Eskridge and Ferejohn also contend that the practices and norms that
are established by statutory and administrative law have the capacity to
"transform Constitutional baselines."'21 For example, they claim that Brown
v. Board of Education's initial prohibition of de jure segregation was trans-
formed into an obligation to eliminate or justify de facto segregation and
thereby integrate the public schools primarily as a result of "administrative
constitutionalism." 22 In this regard, they point out that the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 withheld federal funds from public programs that discriminated on
the basis of race, and that the Elementary and Secondary Education
Amendments of 1965 substantially expanded the amount of federal funds
available to local schools.123 Because these statutes were aggressively en-
forced by federal agencies, such as the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare, to require local school districts to justify de facto segregation,
Eskridge and Ferejohn claim that "public school integration occurred all
117. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 16.
118. Id. at 12-13.
119. Id. at 4-5; see also id. at 53 ("It is primarily for institutional reasons that the
Supreme Court has declined to announce or enforce affirmative obligations and has focused
on enforcing limits and negative rights."); see generally Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Meas-
ure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212
(1978).
120. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 6 (internal citations omitted).
121. Id.
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over the country, especially in the South." 24 Moreover, these statutory and
regulatory initiatives preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Brown II,
which held that segregated school districts had an obligation to transition to
a unitary school system.12S
While one can easily question whether this effort to integrate public
schools has worked, there is little doubt that the "anti-discrimination" norm
that emerged from these efforts has stuck. Eskridge and Ferejohn therefore
provide the Civil Rights Act as a prime example of how super-statutes can
produce institutional structures and public norms that become entrenched in
law and society over time.126 They point out that unlike the norms that are
recognized by the Constitution and enforced pursuant to constitutional law,
the Civil Rights Act prohibited invidious discrimination by private entities,
including many employers.127 Moreover, the statute was implemented and
interpreted by federal agencies and courts in a manner that "created an af-
firmative obligation for state officials to eliminate illegal discrimination,"
and provided powerful incentives for covered entities to achieve "actual
integration, not just nonsegregation."'28
Eskridge and Ferejohn contend that the Civil Rights Act exhibits all of
the features that are necessary for a super-statute to create and entrench pub-
lic institutions or norms.129 First, it was a product of "public deliberation ...
[by] several institutions cooperating together as well as protecting their own
authority," including social movements and the private sector, as well as
executive officials, legislatures, "and, to a lesser extent, judges."'30 Second,
this public deliberation occurred over a long period of time, and the result-
ing anti-discrimination norm did not stick in our public culture until former
opponents agreed that "the norm [was] a good one (or at least an acceptable
idea)."'' Because a social consensus has developed that an anti-
124. Id.
125. See id. ("It was not until 1968, right after the 1964-65 statutes, that the Supreme
Court even ruled that segregated school districts had an obligation to transition to a unitary
school system, where there were no discernible black schools and white schools.").
126. See id. at 7; Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 7, at 1237-42 (describing how the
Civil Rights Act has been interpreted by courts and implemented by agencies to effectively
entrench its anti-discrimination norm).
127. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 7 (describing how the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 extended Brown's anti-discrimination norm and "applied [it] to private as well
as public institutions").
128. Id.
129. See id.; Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 7, at 1237 ("[T]he Civil Rights Act is a
proven super-statute because it embodies a great principle (antidiscrimination), was adopted
after an intense political struggle and normative debate and has over the years entrenched its
norm into American public life, and has pervasively affected federal statutes and constitu-
tional law").
130. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 7.
131. Id.
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discrimination norm should be followed (for reasons apart from its legality),
the Civil Rights Act has "generated strong social entrenchment" that has not
only made it "resistant to change," but has also given it "a power beyond
[its] formal legal ambit."'32 Simply put, most people have come to agree
that discrimination is fundamentally wrong, and that our law and society
should not countenance it. Moreover, the prevailing understanding of dis-
crimination has evolved, and the anti-discrimination norm has been ex-
tended to other "suspect classifications," including sex, pregnancy, age,
disability, national origin, religion, and sexual orientation-largely through
the process of administrative constitutionalism."' Eskridge and Ferejohn
claim that many other institutional practices and public norms have become
entrenched in American law and society as a result of super-statutes, includ-
ing the responsibility of the workplace to accommodate women; the estab-
lishment and protection of voting rights; the responsibility of states to main-
tain free markets; the funding and management of old-age assistance pro-
grams; the regulation of the family; the nondegradation of the environment;
the establishment of a national monetary policy; the treatment of sexual and
gender minorities; and the provision of national security. 34
Eskridge and Ferejohn ultimately contend that the American Constitu-
tion has evolved as a result of administrative constitutionalism, and that this
method of updating the Constitution is normatively desirable.'35 Much of
their book is devoted to describing "the ongoing deliberative process by
which small 'c' constitutional norms and institutions become entrenched in
our polity.""' Contrary to the conventional wisdom, Eskridge and Ferejohn
conclude that in "a republic of statutes[,] . . . normative commitments are
announced and entrenched not through a process of Constitutional amend-
ments or Supreme Court pronouncements but instead through the more gra-
dual process of legislation, administrative implementation, public feedback,
and legislative reaffirmation and elaboration.""'
F. The Key Points of Convergence
I want to suggest that Eskridge and Ferejohn and Friedman essentially
agree on the most fundamental aspects of the process of American constitu-
tional change. First, they agree that constitutional meaning is the result of
an ongoing dialogue between and among governmental officials and inter-
132. Id. at 8.
133. See id. at 12.
134. See id. at 18 (listing the case studies of administrative constitutionalism that are
developed in the book, along with their respective chapters).
135. See id. at 8-9.
136. Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted).
137. Id. at 14 (emphasis omitted).
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ested members of the public. Eskridge and Ferejohn therefore emphasize
that "[t]he dialogic feature of republican deliberation" that characterizes
their theory of administrative constitutionalism
requires differently situated participants and institutions to provide inputs that re-
flect their comparative advantages: agencies provide information about the prob-
lem, including social and economic structures framing the problem and affecting
solutions; legislators balance incommensurable values and create compromises as
well as new governmental structures and programs to deal with the matter; judges
fit and sometimes evaluate legislative directives and agency rules in light of the na-
tion's larger body of law.' 38
Meanwhile, Friedman claims that
[w]hat matters most about judicial review . . . is not the Supreme Court's role in
the process, but how the public reacts to those decisions. This is the most impor-
tant lesson that history teaches. Almost everything consequential about judicial re-
view occurs after the judges rule, not when they do. Judges do not decide finally
on the meaning of the Constitution. Rather, it is through the dialogic process of
'judicial decision-popular response-judicial re-decision' that the Constitution
takes on the meaning it has.13 9
Second, Eskridge and Ferejohn and Friedman agree that the ultimate
responsibility for constitutional meaning rests with "the people," rather than
with the Framers or the Supreme Court. Eskridge and Ferejohn self-
consciously assign a relatively modest role to the Constitution and the
Court, but they claim that their theory "is also more demanding of ordinary
citizens, for it suggests that there is no 'Great Guarantor' of our liberties and
insists that, ultimately, the creation and preservation of our freedoms is a
never-ending project and a burden that falls on us all."u Likewise, Fried-
man contends that "[t]he Constitution is central to American political dis-
course," and that "we have nothing but ourselves to fall back on." 4 ' He
concludes by proclaiming that
[j]udicial review is our invention; we created it and have chosen to retain it. Judi-
cial review has served as a means of forcing us to think about, and interpret, our
Constitution ourselves. In the final analysis, when it comes to the Constitution, we
are the highest court in the land.142
138. Id. at 15. Eskridge and Ferejohn refer favorably to Friedman's theory of consti-
tutional dialogue in a discussion of the relationship between their project and the broader
movement towards "popular constitutionalism" in constitutional theory. See id. at 69-70.
They also recognize that the theory of "[d]eliberation-respecting judicial review" that is set
forth in their conclusion is "most consistent with theories of judicial review that emphasize
institutional dialogue," including Barry Friedman's work. Id. at 436.
139. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 381-82.
140. ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 9.
141. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 385.
142. Id.
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Despite their agreement on these fundamental aspects of the process of
constitutional change, Eskridge and Ferejohn and Friedman explicitly focus
on different stages ofa much broader process. Eskridge and Ferejohn focus
primarily on the development and implementation of constitutional norms
by legislatures and administrative agencies, which is supplemented (and
sometimes short-circuited) by subsequent sub-constitutional and Constitu-
tional decisions by state and federal courts. Meanwhile, Friedman tho-
roughly examines the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions and how
they are received by government officials and other members of society, as
well as how the Court subsequently reacts to its assessment of "public opi-
nion."' 43 The next Part demonstrates that by integrating their respective
analyses, we can begin to understand the complete picture of constitutional
dialogue in a republic of statutes.
III. THE PROCESS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
By integrating Professor Friedman's theory of constitutional dialogue
with the lessons of "administrative constitutionalism," we can develop a
better understanding of the entire process of constitutional change. Ameri-
can constitutional change is obviously not solely a function of the amend-
ments adopted pursuant to Article V. Nor is it just a function of judicial
review. Rather, as Friedman suggests, constitutional change is also a func-
tion of how society responds to the Court's decisions, and how the Court
tailors its decisions to prior and anticipated reactions to its work. Moreover,
as scholars of regulatory constitutionalism suggest, constitutional change is
also a function of the structures and norms established by legislatures, ad-
ministrative agencies, and the attentive public that influences their work.
The meaning of the American Constitution at any particular moment in time
is the result of an ongoing deliberative process (or dialogue) that includes
the Court, as well as other governmental institutions and politically engaged
members of the public.
The first step of this broader process of constitutional change was the
ratification of the Constitution, along with the Bill of Rights and a few sub-
sequent, important Article V amendments. The second step of the process
consists of the administrative constitutionalism that has been the focus of
recent work by Eskridge, Ferejohn, and other prominent public law scho-
lars. During this stage, Congress, the executive branch, state legislatures,
143. Friedman has recently explained that his book's focus on the process of constitu-
tional change was an accidental by-product of his interest in the relationship between popular
opinion and judicial review. See Friedman, supra note 10, at 1235 (recognizing that "The
Will of the People depicts the process of constitutional change," and explaining that while
this was not the book's purpose, "it bubbled up as [the] narrative developed, emerging ines-
capably from the interrelationship of popular opinion and judicial review").
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and administrative agencies establish institutions of government, develop
their operative procedures, and set limitations on governmental authority, in
addition to establishing substantive rules, policies, and rights. These institu-
tions and norms-and how they and their work are interpreted and reviewed
by courts in "ordinary" cases-are heavily influenced by the Constitution,
and they can become deeply entrenched in law and society as a functional
matter. At the same time, the institutions and norms that are established at
this stage of the process can potentially influence how the Constitution is
subsequently understood as well. In other words, statutory and administra-
tive law (as well as state constitutionalism) can result in the creation of new
(or different) constitutional norms in law and society. Moreover, this can
occur as a functional matter even if the institutions and norms that are estab-
lished pursuant to administrative constitutionalism are never subject to judi-
cial review.
The third step of the process of constitutional change occurs when the
institutions or norms that are established by the regulatory state are subject
to judicial review to assess their compatibility with the Constitution (what
Eskridge and Ferejohn might call "Large-C constitutional challenges"). The
Supreme Court has substantial discretion to decide when, if ever, it will hear
a large-C constitutional challenge on a particular topic, which substantially
raises the stakes of the underlying issues by potentially increasing the extent
to which a particular position becomes legally entrenched. Nonetheless,
when the Court makes a constitutional decision, it can either remand the
matter back to the political process by invoking one or more of the "passive
virtues,"'" invalidate the challenged legislative or administrative decisions,
or solidify and further entrench those decisions by upholding their constitu-
tionality or concluding that certain legislative or administrative solutions are
constitutionally required. As Friedman suggests, when the Court makes its
decisions at this stage of the process, it will often consider the likely societal
reaction, and, in particular, whether there are powerful constituencies who
will support what the Court is planning to do.
The fourth stage of the process of constitutional change is what I will
refer to as Friedmanesque dialogue. As Professor Friedman demonstrates,
when the Court makes constitutional decisions, members of society will
often react and provide feedback to the Court regarding the validity and
implications of its particular holdings and its broader understanding of the
Constitution. This feedback can range from criticism by scholars and
elected officials, to efforts to amend the Constitution, strip the Court's juris-
diction, impeach the justices, refuse to enforce the Court's orders, and pack
the Court. The societal reaction to the Court's decisions can ultimately lead
144. See Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The
Passive Virtues, 75 HARv. L. REv. 40 (1961); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1986).
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to more sustained political movements that seek to use the Court's most
controversial decisions to achieve other political goals, change the composi-
tion of the Court, and eventually convince the Court to change its mind.
Even if the Court was oblivious to all of this feedback, its decisions routine-
ly lead to responses by legislatures, administrative agencies, and other pub-
lic officials, who can internalize the Court's understanding of the Constitu-
tion, engage in efforts to get around the Court's decisions, or try significant-
ly different approaches to the underlying problems (and here we are, once
again, back in the second stage of this ongoing process). In any event,
elected officials and administrators will also pursue other initiatives that
will eventually implicate and shed further light upon the underlying consti-
tutional norms.
The complete process of American constitutional change that emerges
from this integrated analysis can therefore be depicted as follows:




I want to emphasize three aspects of this framework for understanding
constitutional change. First, this framework helps to place Professor Fried-
man's tremendous contribution to the literature on American constitutional-
ism in its proper context. In essence, he has provided a great deal of insight
on how the third step of the process-constitutional decision making by the
Supreme Court-has actually worked in practice, and he has also provided
the comprehensive historical treatment of the fourth step of the process
(which, thus, merits the name, Friedmanesque dialogue). Second, this
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broader framework suggests that the ratification of the Constitution by the
Framers will predictably play a relatively marginal role in the development
of constitutional meaning because it is the only static part, and it is also the
most general and abstract part, of the entire process. Indeed, most of the
institutional avenues for influencing the development of constitutional
meaning over time are neither mandated nor explicitly governed by the
Constitution. Third, and relatedly, this framework suggests that constitu-
tional meaning is the result of an ongoing, deliberative process (or dialogue)
that is influenced not only by the original meaning of the document, but also
by the subsequent views of presidents, legislators, and administrators, as
well as by judges and ordinary citizens. The final Part of this Essay identi-
fies the key questions that are posed by this framework, and discusses a few
of its implications.
IV. FORWARD PROGRESS
The process of American constitutional change that emerges from in-
tegrating Professor Friedman's work with the lessons of administrative con-
stitutionalism suggests that judicial review cannot fairly be characterized as
anti-democratic, even if we are unable to assess the extent to which the Su-
preme Court's decisions comport with "the will of the people." Rather,
judicial review is simply one important aspect of a broader constitutional
dialogue that takes place within and among a variety of democratic institu-
tions. There are, moreover, many ways for elected officials and ordinary
citizens to participate in the process and potentially to influence both the
formal and functional meaning of the Constitution. The key questions that
emerge from this framework are therefore not whether judicial review can
be squared with constitutional democracy, but rather when judicial review
should be exercised and how the various stages of the broader process ideal-
ly should and do work.
The timing of judicial review is vitally important on a couple of dif-
ferent levels. As noted above, the Supreme Court has substantial control
over its docket and can therefore generally decide when, if ever, it wants to
confront any particular issue.14 If the Court declines to exercise judicial
review, the issue will typically be addressed and initially resolved by public
officials and engaged citizens pursuant to the processes of administrative
145. See Charles Tiefer, The Flag-Burning Controversy 1989-1990: Congress' Valid
Role in Constitutional Dialogue, 29 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 357, 382-88 (1992) (discussing the
process of agenda-setting in the Supreme Court and claiming that "as the Justices exercise
their agenda-setting discretion, they do so with a degree of personal power and unaccounta-
bility that is breathtaking when contemplating the consequences of that exercise"). For a
discussion of possible abuses of this discretion, see Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and
Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIz. L. REV.
993 (2009).
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constitutionalism." The resulting solutions will be formally subject to
change at any time pursuant to the ordinary political process, but the institu-
tional structures and legal rights that are established in this manner may
become deeply entrenched as a functional matter. 14 7 If the Court exercises
judicial review, it typically raises the stakes of the underlying issues by in-
validating prior legislative or administrative decisions (which may them-
selves have become deeply entrenched) or by solidifying and further en-
trenching those decisions by upholding their validity or declaring that cer-
tain legislative or administrative solutions are constitutionally required.'48
When the Court intervenes too early, it may foreclose the development of
'more democratic" solutions pursuant to the processes of administrative
constitutionalism.'49 If the Court waits too long to intervene, it may increase
the political costs of judicial review by increasing the likelihood that the
Court will invalidate politically entrenched institutions or norms.' If the
Court refuses to intervene, it may be allowing institutions or norms that
violate its conception of the Constitution to stand. Professor Friedman's
work suggests that the Court's decisions regarding if and when to exercise
146. A couple of recent decisions have vividly demonstrated the potential importance
of the lower federal courts in this process. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F Supp. 2d 921
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding that California's Proposition 8 is unconstitutional under the 14th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); United States v. Arizona, 703 F. Supp. 2d 980 (D.
Ariz. 2010) (granting a preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of significant portions
of Arizona's Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act based on federal
law). While a detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Essay, the precise
role of the lower federal courts in the process of American constitutional change is a topic
that warrants greater scholarly attention. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 295-308, 335-36
(discussing the existing literature on the impact of lower courts on the Supreme Court and
noting that "[n]ormative theory has failed to develop a satisfactory (or almost any) account of
the lower courts' role in the development of constitutional meaning").
147. See supra notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
148. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 383 (recognizing that "one of the most important
features of Supreme Court decisions .. . is that they are 'sticky,' which is to say that they are
difficult to change or get around," and explaining that "[w]hen a decision is put on constitu-
tional grounds, it takes greater mobilization, and often more time, to develop the political
will to change it").
149. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts Can Support
Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1310 (2005) (claiming
that judicial review can undermine democracy and "raise the stakes of politics by taking
issues away from the political system prematurely"); see also Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra
note 109, at 1275-86 (claiming that "judicial review should avoid closing off democratic
deliberation, should respect the products of such deliberation, and should create constitution-
al floors only when supported by deliberation among a wide array of represented interests").
150. See John H. Blume et al., Education and Interrogation: Comparing Brown and
Miranda, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 321, 332-34 (2005) (claiming that Brown and Miranda both
generated a "vociferous backlash" when they were decided because both decisions addressed
"entrenched, institutional racism in America," and "were viewed (correctly) as threats to the
power structure existing in the United States").
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the power of judicial review will often have complicated and uncertain ef-
fects on both the political process and public perceptions of the Court's legi-
timacy.' While Friedman arguably shows that the Court needs powerful
friends or allies to make bold or controversial decisions, the Court will often
retain substantial discretion regarding when it can or should intervene. The
manner in which the Court exercises this discretion will, in turn, have a ma-
jor impact on the eventual shape of the Constitution's meaning.
The operation of each of the three dynamic stages of the process of
American constitutional change will also have a significant impact on the
formal and functional meaning of the Constitution. First, the legislative and
administrative processes will have a tremendous impact on which institu-
tional structures and public norms are adopted and subsequently entrenched
pursuant to the mechanisms of administrative constitutionalism. Second,
the manner in which the Court exercises the power of judicial review will
obviously have a major impact on the meaning of the Constitution. Third,
as Friedman demonstrates, the way in which public officials and the atten-
tive public respond to the Court's decisions will influence subsequent exer-
cises of judicial review and what occurs in the legislative and administrative
processes-and thereby also influence the Constitution's meaning. Profes-
sor Friedman has taught us a great deal about the operation of the latter two
stages of the process of American constitutional change, but we still need to
learn more about the operation of all three stages of the process and how
they interact with one another, as well as to develop normative theories that
incorporate administrative constitutionalism, judicial review, and constitu-
tional dialogue. In other words, we still need to learn and think more about
how the entire process of American constitutional change really does and
ideally should work.
The process of American constitutional change that emerges from in-
tegrating Professor Friedman's work with the lessons of administrative con-
stitutionalism has several important implications for constitutional theory.
First, it suggests that the contemporary distinction between constitutional
law and legislation and administrative law is widely overdrawn and largely
misplaced. 52 These are not, in reality, separate fields of study, but they are
instead closely related and frequently overlapping components of a larger
151. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 304-15, 346-48, 350-53, 362-63, 383-85 (de-
scribing how political activists use controversial decisions by the Court to serve a broad
range of partisan goals).
152. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 20 (claiming that "[tjhe sharp dif-
ferences between Constitutional and statutory interpretation ought to be questioned in the
light of [their account of] civil rights, voting, social security, finance, antitrust, environmen-
tal, and national security statutes," and arguing that "statutory interpretation involving legis-
lative or administrative efforts to entrench new norms that have big consequences for society
ought to consider the broader matters typically consigned to theories of Constitutional inter-
pretation").
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system for establishing and potentially entrenching democratic institutions
and public norms. Thus, for example, in litigation, private parties routinely
challenge the validity of governmental action on constitutional, statutory,
and administrative law grounds."' The tendency of legal scholars to focus
on one aspect of the process to the exclusion or detriment of others will
therefore predictably lead to analyses that are incomplete and potentially
misleading. Given the open-texture of the Constitution, the ubiquity of ad-
ministrative constitutionalism, and the relative infrequency of judicial re-
view, there is certainly no warrant for believing that the study of legislation
or administrative law is less important than traditional constitutional law
scholarship. On the contrary, a more accurate understanding of the entire
process of American constitutional change demonstrates the importance of
research on legislation and administrative law for the larger project of con-
stitutionalism.
A second implication of this more complete framework of American
constitutional change is that theories of representation and deliberative de-
mocracy should be of central relevance to normative theorizing about the
development of constitutional meaning. If constitutional meaning is influ-
enced by considerations beyond the original meaning of the text and the
decisions rendered in judicial review, then the workings of administrative
constitutionalism and Friedmanesque dialogue will be of tremendous signi-
ficance to the enterprise. Moreover, ordinary citizens do have meaningful
opportunities to participate in these stages of the process in a republican
democracy because they can elect certain representatives and seek to influ-
ence the legislative and administrative processes more directly as individu-
als and members of interest groups. On the other hand, for reasons ex-
plained above, we cannot plausibly assume that the results of the legislative
and administrative processes or constitutional dialogue will typically reflect
"the will of the people." Rather, they will reflect discretionary choices that
are made by elected representatives and other public officials pursuant to
deliberative processes within and among various democratic institutions.
Constitutional scholars therefore need to develop theories regarding how
this discretionary authority should be exercised, as both a substantive and a
procedural matter. Should representatives follow their constituents' pre-
political preferences or exercise their own independent judgment? How
153. See, e.g., Complaint, Aref et al. v. Holder, 2010 WL 1371980 (D. D.C. 2010)
(No. 1:10-cv-00539) (challenging alleged actions of the Bureau of Prisons under the First,
Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act);
Verified Amended and Substituted Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, a Restraining Order
and Preliminary and Permanent Injunctive Relieve, Hall v. Leavitt, 2008 WL 5740069 (D.
D.C. 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-01715-RMC) (claiming that certain decisions by the Social Security
Administration were contrary to the Social Security Act, the Medicare Act, the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, and several provisions of the Constitution).
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should elected representatives and other public officials ascertain public
opinion or formulate their own policy views? What obligations, if any, do
public officials have to consider and respect the interests and perspectives of
minorities or to justify their decisions with public-regarding reasons? The
answers to these questions will turn on theories of representation and deli-
berative democracy, and such theories should therefore be of central relev-
ance to our thinking about constitutionalism.'54 In my view, those theories
also offer the best prospects for developing a Constitution that respects the
rights and interests of everyone, and thereby fulfills the central hope that
American society has traditionally placed in judicial review. In reference to
judicial review, Professor Friedman claimed that "[w]hat we ought to care
deeply about, what we ought to be asking, is how much capacity the justices
have to act independently of the public's views, how likely they are to do
so, and in what situations.""' He also emphasized the importance of prop-
erly evaluating the "threat" that judicial review poses for democracy, along
with its capacity to fulfill the "hope" of protecting the fundamental rights of
minorities."' These are precisely the types of questions that we should be
asking about every public official in every democratic institution because
the reconciliation of majoritarian preferences and minority interests is ulti-
mately central to theories of constitutional democracy more generally.
Finally, the process of American constitutional change that emerges
from integrating Professor Friedman's work with the lessons of administra-
tive constitutionalism demonstrates a couple of salient facts about the nature
of our constitutional system which are sometimes contested. Specifically,
the Constitution's meaning was not fixed when the document was ratified.
154. Eskridge's and Ferejohn's book presents a theory of "deliberation-respecting
judicial review" that places heavy emphasis on the need to encourage and respect democratic
deliberation. See ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 7, at 431-68; see also Eskridge & Fere-
john, supra note 109. While I agree with much of their analysis and believe that their theory
is on the right track, a detailed evaluation of their theory of judicial review is beyond the
scope of this Essay. For excellent examples of influential discussions of deliberative democ-
racy more generally, see Joseph M. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy: The Majority Prin-
ciple in Republican Government, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION? 102 (Robert A.
Goldwin & William A. Schambra, eds., 1980); Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic
Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY: NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE STATE 17 (Alan Hamlin &
Philip Pettit, eds., 1989); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1988); GUTMANN &
THOMPSON, supra note 14; AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT (1996); PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND
GOVERNMENT (1997); HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC REASONING
ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY (2002).
155. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 373 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 370; see also Friedman, supra note 2, at 309-11 (describing the "threat"
and "hope" of judicial review, and explaining that "[p]ositive scholars have long doubted the
descriptive accuracy of both normative stories about judicial review, largely because they
doubt the premise that judges have the capacity to interfere regularly with the work of the
other branches").
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Rather, the participants in the processes of administrative constitutionalism
and Friedmanesque dialogue-including regulatory scholars, constitutional
theorists, political scientists, political activists, and public officials-are all
engaged in the common enterprise of developing constitutional meaning on
a daily basis. While existing inequalities and structural flaws in the process
arguably make it an overstatement to say that "we are the highest court in
the land,""' it would be difficult to dispute that the United States does have
a living Constitution after all.
CONCLUSION
The Will of the People is a majestic story about the history of the rela-
tionship between the Supreme Court and public opinion. In my view, how-
ever, the very idea of "the will of the people" poses overwhelming concep-
tual difficulties and measurement problems that undermine any effort to
assess the extent to which the power of judicial review and the Court's par-
ticular decisions "reflect the considered judgment of the American people
regarding their most fundamental values."' That said, it is undoubtedly
true that society reacts to the Court's decisions, and that the Court often
takes both actual and anticipated societal reactions into account in making
its decisions. Those reactions, however, are typically driven by the views of
influential individuals and groups within society, and they are typically ex-
pressed through the work of other democratic institutions. Consistent with
this perspective, several prominent scholars have recently pointed out that
statutory and administrative law frequently perform constitutional functions
in the modem regulatory state, and that the work of legislatures and agen-
cies has a reciprocal relationship with the Constitution.
This Essay has claimed that by integrating Professor Friedman's
theory of constitutional dialogue with the recent literature on administrative
constitutionalism, we can develop a better understanding of the entire
process of American constitutional change. The novel framework that I
have set forth also places Friedman's invaluable contribution to the enter-
prise in its proper context. This framework demonstrates the importance of
legislation and administrative law to the ongoing development of constitu-
tional meaning, and it suggests that theories of representation and delibera-
tive democracy should be central to normative constitutional theory. It also
suggests-as Barry Friedman has taught so many of us in his inspiring fa-
shion over the years-that "the people" do have a prominent role to play in
continuing to develop the meaning of the Constitution.
157. FRIEDMAN, supra note 4, at 385 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 368.
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